Virgin Islands v. Moolenaar by unknown
1998 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
1-8-1998 
Virgin Islands v. Moolenaar 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1998 
Recommended Citation 
"Virgin Islands v. Moolenaar" (1998). 1998 Decisions. 3. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1998/3 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 1998 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
Filed January 8, 1998 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 




GOVERNMENT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS, 






On Appeal from the District Court of the Virgin Islands 
(D.C. No. 95-cr-00112) 
 
Argued December 8, 1997 
 
Before: SLOVITER, Chief Judge, 
STAPLETON and MANSMANN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed January 8, 1998) 
 
       Carol S. Moore (Argued) 
       Maureen P. Cormier 
       Office of Attorney General 
        of Virgin Islands 
       Department of Justice 
       Charlotte Amalie, St. Thomas 00802 
 
        Attorneys for Appellant 
 
       Alan D. Smith (Argued) 
       Hodge & Francois 
       Charlotte Amalie, St. Thomas 00802 
 




OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Chief Judge. 
 
The Government of the Virgin Islands appeals from the 
decision of the District Court of the Virgin Islands Appellate 
Division holding that the Information charging Roy 
Moolenaar with Burglary in the Second Degree was 




On March 1, 1994, Moolenaar was charged in a one- 
count Information with Burglary in the Second Degree, in 
violation of 14 V.I.C. S 443. 
 
The Information provided: 
 
        On or about February 18, 1994, in St. Thomas, U.S. 
       Virgin Islands, Roy Moolenaar, no known address, St. 
       Thomas, Virgin Islands, did with the intent to commit 
       the crime of theft therein, break and enter a dwelling 
       house, to wit Ross-Taaneberg #27, in which there was 
       present a human being, to wit Altagracia Hoheb, in 
       violation of 14 V.I.C. 443. 
 
App. at 3 (emphasis added). 
 
At trial the government presented evidence that on 
February 18, 1994, police received a report of breaking and 
entering at No. 27 Ross-Taaneberg, which was occupied at 
the time of the incident by Altagracia Hoheb, her three 
daughters and two grandchildren. Tr. Vol. I at 121, 127. 
According to police, an intruder entered through a window, 
removed his shoes, opened both the front and back doors 
to the house, took house keys from the dead bolt lock, and 
rummaged through the house. Tr. Vol. I at 114-115, 209, 
Tr. Vol. II at 45. Hoheb was awakened by her daughter, and 
instructed her to call the police. Tr. Vol. I at 102-103. One 
of Hoheb's daughters saw the intruder by her bedroom and 
screamed, and the intruder ran out of the house. Tr. Vol. I 
at 91. The police arrived at the residence and saw someone 
coming out the front door and after a chase they 
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apprehended Moolenaar. Tr. Vol. I at 130-131. During a 
subsequent search, Hoheb's keys were found in 
Moolenaar's jacket pocket. Tr. Vol. I at 136. 
 
Moolenaar did not testify at his trial, but he called as his 
only witness Jhon [sic] Parsons, who testified that he was 
with Moolenaar on the night in question and that they were 
both approached by a car, that an occupant of the car fired 
shots and that he and Moolenaar both fled in different 
directions. Tr. Vol. II at 97-100. Moolenaar's attorney later 
attempted to use this testimony to argue that Moolenaar 
had entered the house to seek refuge from his assailants, 
and not with the intent to commit a crime, which is a 
requisite to Burglary in the Second Degree. Tr. Vol. II at 
116. 
 
At the close of the government's case, Moolenaar made a 
motion under Rule 29 for a Judgment of Acquittal on the 
basis of insufficient evidence. At oral argument on that 
motion, he also contended that the Information was 
insufficient because it stated that the intent of the breaking 
and entering was to commit theft, whereas theft is not a 
specified crime in the Virgin Islands. The Territorial Court 
denied the motion, rejecting the challenge to the sufficiency 
of the Information on the ground that larceny, which is a 
crime in the Virgin Islands, is "almost synonymous" with 
theft, app. at 36, and that Moolenaar had been given ample 
notice. 
 
Moolenaar was convicted after a two-day jury trial, and 
was sentenced to 15 years incarceration and assessed $25 
as court costs. On appeal, the District Court of the Virgin 
Islands Appellate Division held that the Information was 
insufficient, reversed Moolenaar's conviction and remanded 




The sufficiency of an information, like the sufficiency of 
an indictment, presents a question of law over which our 
review is plenary. See United States v. Henry, 29 F.3d 112, 
113 (3d Cir. 1994). 
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Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(c), governing the 
nature and contents of indictments and informations, 
provides: 
 
        (1) In General. The indictment or the information 
       shall be a plain, concise and definite written statement 
       of the essential facts constituting the offense charged 
       . . . . The indictment or information shall state for each 
       count the official or customary citation of the statute, 
       rule, regulation or other provision of law which the 
       defendant is alleged therein to have violated. 
 
       * * * 
 
        (3) Harmless Error. Error in the citation or its 
       omission shall not be ground for dismissal of the 
       indictment or information or for reversal of a conviction 
       if the error or omission did not mislead the defendant 
       to the defendant's prejudice. 
 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c). 
 
In Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749 (1962), the 
Supreme Court considered the sufficiency of an indictment 
of a defendant charged with refusing to answer a question 
in testifying before a congressional committee. The Court 
referred to a two-part test established in prior cases for 
measuring the sufficiency of an indictment, to wit 1) 
whether the indictment "contains the elements of the 
offense intended to be charged and sufficiently apprises the 
defendant of what he must be prepared to meet," and 2) 
enables the defendant to plead an acquittal or conviction in 
bar of future prosecutions for the same offense. Id. at 763- 
64 (citations omitted). We have applied the Russell test 
interchangeably to challenges to the sufficiency of an 
indictment and an information. See Government of the 
Virgin Islands v. Pemberton, 813 F.2d 626, 631 (3d Cir. 
1987). 
 
The Virgin Islands statute on Burglary in the Second 
Degree provides: 
 
        Whoever, with intent to commit some offense therein 
       breaks and enters the dwelling house, building, or 
       structure of another in which there is a human being, 
       under circumstances not amounting to burglary in the 
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       first degree, is guilty of burglary in the second degree. 
       . . . 
 
14 V.I.C. S 443 (emphasis added). 
 
Thus, the crime of Burglary in the Second Degree 
requires that the breaking and entering be with the intent 
to commit "some offense." An "offense" is defined in the 
Virgin Islands Code as an act committed in violation of a 
law of the Virgin Islands and punishable by, inter alia, a 
fine or imprisonment. 14 V.I.C. S 1. 
 
The Information charging Moolenaar describes the offense 
Moolenaar intended to commit when breaking and entering 
as "theft." However, there is no crime denominated "theft" 
in the Virgin Islands Code. Instead, the unlawful taking of 
property of another in the Virgin Islands is characterized as 
"larceny," defined as "the unlawful taking, stealing, 
carrying, leading, or driving away the personal property of 
another." 14 V.I.C. S 1081(a). We must thus determine 
whether the use of the word "theft" instead of "larceny" in 
the Information rendered the Information insufficient. 
 
In applying the Russell test, the Territorial Court held 
that the totality of the Information gave Moolenaar 
sufficient notice of what he was charged with and what he 
had to defend. App. at 39. The court noted that Black's Law 
Dictionary states that theft is the "popular name" for 
larceny and that a dictionary that lay persons would use 
makes a similar connection. The court concluded that the 
common understanding of "theft" is almost synonymous 
with "larceny." App. at 36. 
 
In contrast, the Appellate Division held that the 
Information did not state the crime of burglary "because it 
does not recite an essential element of that crime, namely, 
the offense [the defendant] intended to commit once he got 
inside." App. at 12. The court reasoned that a charge which 
fails to state a crime is insufficient to apprise a defendant 
of what he must be prepared to meet. App. at 12. The 
Appellate Division stated that "[w]hether the word `theft' 
might have alerted Moolenaar of the gist of what he was 
facing is irrelevant because the single count information did 
not charge a crime." App. at 13. It stated that "theft" may 
be included in the concept of larceny, id., but also 
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suggested that "theft" is a more expansive term than 
"larceny." App. at 13 n.8. 
 
In addition, the Appellate Division concluded that the 
Information failed Russell's second requirement because, 
although the charge clearly delineated the time and place of 
the burglary, it failed to tell "what crime he is alleged to 
have intended to commit once he got inside" and would not 
protect Moolenaar from again being put in jeopardy. App. at 
13. 
 
On appeal, the government contends that the Appellate 
Division erred as a matter of law, and argues that the fact 
that the Information used a common law term to describe 
an element of burglary instead of using the statutory 
language did not render the Information insufficient. We 
agree. 
 
We know of no authority, and Moolenaar cites none, that 
supports the Appellate Division's holding that a charge of 
burglary will be insufficient unless the crime that was 
intended is framed in the exact statutory language. As set 
forth by one of the leading commentators, "[f]ailure to allege 
the statutory elements will not be fatal provided that 
alternative language is used or that the essential elements 
are charged in the indictment by necessary implication." 24 
Moore's Federal Practice, S 607.04[2][b][ii] (3d ed. 1997). 
 
This is particularly true in the context of burglary when 
the issue centers on the language used to describe the 
offense intended in breaking and entering. Thus, for 
example, in United States v. Dyba, 554 F.2d 417, 419 (10th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 830 (1977), the indictment 
charged the defendant with "burglary of monies" as the 
underlying offense for a statute that criminalized entry into 
a bank with the intent to commit "any felony." The court 
held that although the correct term would have been 
"larceny of monies," the use of the term "burglary of 
monies" was sufficient because the term `burglary' 
"imported an unlawful entry with intent to steal," and 
"provided the accused with adequate notice of the offense 
charged." Id. 
 
Similarly, in Johnson v. Turner, 429 F.2d 1152, 1154-55 
(10th Cir. 1970), a defendant who was convicted of grand 
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larceny contended in a petition for habeas corpus that the 
information was constitutionally defective because it 
charged merely that defendant "stole" a guitar and failed to 
identify the specific criminal statute alleged to have been 
violated. The court denied the petition, holding that the 
charge fully apprised the defendant of the nature of the 
charge and of the facts alleged by the prosecution. Id. at 
1155. 
 
The authorities on which Moolenaar relies to contend 
that the Information did not give him sufficient notice are 
not apposite. In Pemberton, 813 F.2d at 630, the 
information charging Burglary in the Third Degree alleged 
merely breaking and entering a building with "intent to 
commit an offense therein." We held the information was 
inadequate because it did not contain an essential element 
of the offense and insufficiently apprised the defendant of 
what he must be prepared to meet. Id. at 632. To the same 
effect, in United States v. Thomas, 444 F.2d 919 (D.C. Cir. 
1971), the court held insufficient an indictment charging 
defendant with burglary that merely alleged that he entered 
a dwelling "with intent to commit a criminal offense 
therein." Id. at 920. The court held that this language was 
"impermissibly broad and categorical." Id. at 922. 
 
Similarly, in United States v. Deutsch, 243 F.2d 435, 436 
(3d Cir. 1957), the indictment purported to charge a 
conspiracy to violate bankruptcy laws but merely stated in 
the relevant portion that the defendants "conspired to 
commit offenses against the United States." We held that 
the charge of conspiracy is "in itself a wholly inadequate 
generality." Id. 
 
The Information charging Moolenaar did more than use 
the generic term "offense," and instead specifically 
described the intent of the breaking and entering as to 
commit "theft." In the context of this case and this 
Information, we reject the narrow and constricted 
interpretation of the Appellate Division that because "theft" 
is not itself an "offense," no crime of burglary was charged. 
As the Territorial Court noted, the dictionary meanings of 
larceny and theft are very similar. 
 
"Theft" is neither a word in a foreign language nor a word 
that is unknown to the Virgin Islands legislature. The 
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Virgin Islands Code includes several other criminal statutes 
that refer to "theft" in a context that suggests that the term 
is being used to describe the unlawful taking of property. 
See, e.g., 14 V.I.C. S 3003 ("theft" by obtaining a credit card 
through fraudulent means); 14 V.I.C. S 1385 (crime to make 
a false report of "theft or conversion" of a vehicle); 14 V.I.C. 
S 1749 (regarding "[u]nauthorized presence on school 
premises" and providing for consecutive sentences"for 
conviction on any other count for the same incident of 
unauthorized presence, such as vandalism, theft or 
assault"). As the government argues, these references 
signify that the legislature assumes that the word is so 
commonplace that its meaning is obvious. 
 
In the context of an Information alleging breaking and 
entering of a dwelling, we can think of no reasonable 
interpretation of the phrase "crime of theft" other than 
larceny. Moolenaar has suggested none. While he argues 
that a "crime of theft" may encompass embezzlement and 
fraud, as well as larceny, when the phrase "crime of theft" 
is used in conjunction with a charge of breaking and 
entering, it is apparent that it is used to signify larceny. 
Fraud and embezzlement necessarily involve securing 
possession of another's property by deception, not by 
breaking and entering his dwelling. The spirit of Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 7 requires that we read the Information as a whole 
and interpret it in a common sense manner. See 24 Moore's 
Federal Practice, S 607.04[2][b][ii]. 
 
We thus conclude that despite the Information's use of 
the word "theft" instead of the statutory term "larceny," 
Moolenaar was provided with sufficient notice to satisfy the 
first requirement of Russell. 
 
With respect to the second element of the Russell inquiry, 
we see no reason why Moolenaar would be at risk of double 
jeopardy based on this Information. Moolenaar merely 
argues that because the Information "fails to charge a 
crime" there is no way to determine what underlying offense 
the government sought to prove at trial and thus he would 
not be protected if he were to be tried again for a crime 
taking place at the same time and location as the one in 
the present Information. Appellee's Br. at 10-11. 
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However, in Russell, in holding that the indictment was 
sufficient to prevent future prosecution, the Court relied on 
the fact that the indictment contained a description of the 
acts alleged and specifics such as the time and location of 
the events in question. Russell, 369 U.S. at 764. Here, too, 
the Information described the conduct and provided the 
date and location of the charged offense. Moreover, should 
any issue arise in the future, Moolenaar can use the entire 
record of the prosecution to prevent twice being tried for 
the same crime. Id. We see no realistic danger to Moolenaar 
of being placed again in jeopardy for the same crime. 
 
Finally, it is significant that Moolenaar does not contend 
that he was misled or surprised by the Information's use of 
the term "theft" instead of "larceny." Instead, he merely 
argues that prejudice to the accused is inherent whenever 
one is convicted on an information which fails to state a 
crime. 
 
Our decision in United States v. Hall, 979 F.2d 320 (3d 
Cir. 1992), provides some guidance. In that case, the 
indictment charged the defendant with "driv[ing] a motor 
vehicle upon a highway within [Gettysburg National 
Military] Park while under the influence of intoxicating 
liquor" in violation of a Pennsylvania statute through the 
application of the Assimilative Crimes Act (ACA). Id. at 322. 
We held that the trial court's jurisdiction should have been 
based on an applicable federal regulation, rather than the 
ACA, but concluded that "[t]he citation of the wrong statute 
in an indictment is not grounds for reversal of a conviction 
unless the defendant was misled to his or her prejudice. 
. . . There is no prejudice from the citation to an 
inapplicable statute when the elements of the two crimes 
are the same and the defendant was adequately apprised of 
the charges." Id. at 323. 
 
Moolenaar does not allege any specific prejudice. 
Moreover, there is ample basis to conclude that Moolenaar 
was not prejudiced in any way by the technical irregularity 
in the Information as both the prosecution and the defense 
focused on whether Moolenaar had the intent to steal. At 
trial, the prosecution emphasized the taking of the keys 
from Hoheb's house and the defense sought to prove that 
Moolenaar entered the house to seek refuge rather than to 
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steal. For example, during closing argument, Moolenaar's 
counsel focused on the fact that there was no "intent to 
steal a set of keys." Tr. Vol. II at 113. Further, at several 
times during cross examination of government witnesses, 
Moolenaar's counsel inquired into the chain of custody of 
the keys police found on Moolenaar and their identity. Tr. 
Vol. I at 166-69, 188. These questions and the strategy of 
the defense demonstrate that the defense focused on 





We therefore conclude that the Appellate Division erred in 
reversing Moolenaar's conviction. The Information 
sufficiently charged the Virgin Islands offense of Burglary in 
the Second Degree. 
 
In reversing Moolenaar's conviction, the Appellate 
Division focused only on the issue challenging the 
sufficiency of the Information, and never reached the 
additional claims raised by Moolenaar in his appeal to that 
court. The Appellate Division's opinion notes that it did not 
reach Moolenaar's contentions that the trial court 
committed plain error by failing to define the crime of theft 
or larceny and by failing to instruct the jury that larceny 
and the crime of theft are synonymous, and that he is 
therefore entitled to a new trial. See App. at 10 n.3. On 
remand, the Appellate Division will have the opportunity to 
address these issues. 
 
For the reasons set forth, we will reverse the judgment of 
the Appellate Division and remand this case to it for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
A True Copy: 
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